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Blaming Socrates: Modernism and the Historical Imagination


For many British writers in the early twentieth century, Socrates’ philosophical legacy was understood as part of the inauguration of a distinctively modern era. The sense that the intellectual, political and cultural meanings of modernity could be read in and through the figure of Socrates emerges in many texts of the period. For example, when Francis Cornford set out in 1932 to explicate ‘the contribution of Ancient Greece to modern life’, he produced a volume of essays entitled Before and After Socrates.​[1]​ Cornford’s aim in this series of essays was to explore the significance of the shift from what he sees as a presocratic emphasis on the philosophy of nature towards a Socratic preoccupation with the philosophical examination of human life. For Cornford, the Socratic moment is centrally concerned with the historical imagination: he suggests that it was Socrates’ pessimism about the possibility of finding a rational and intelligible system in history that turned him away from the study of the external world. Cornford recognised the innovative quality of presocratic philosophy, stressing its repudiation of myth and its exploration of the ‘the idea that external objects have a nature of their own, foreign to man’s nature, and having neither sympathy nor hostility towards his passions and desires’ (BAS, 9).  He understands this presocratic innovation in terms of a move from savagery to civilization: a civilization that is however limited by its materialism and its preoccupation with impersonal systems of understanding. Socrates, Cornford argues, added a dimension of ethical and political reflection to philosophy, which allowed for the distinctively modern concept of autonomy: ‘the individual, if he is to become a complete man, must become morally autonomous, and take his own life into his own control’ (46). Cornford goes on to argue that the Socratic legacy is best understood in terms of a ‘spiritual manhood’ (53), which will find institutional expression in the modes of education and of philosophical inquiry developed in and sustained by Plato’s Academy.
	This link between modernity and the philosophical legacy of Socrates can be found in many other texts from the early years of the twentieth century. For example, in Maurice Francis Egan’s introduction to a translation of Plato’s Dialogues published in 1900, Egan asks ‘who of the moderns has escaped’ the philosophical influence of Socrates: his answer is ‘not one’.​[2]​ Equally, for J. B. Bury, writing in 1926, the trial of Socrates has a central place in any history of the development of reason and the social practice of toleration. Bury claims Socrates as a hero rather than as a martyr, because ‘I can find no evidence that Socrates wished to die. But, and this is quite a different thing, he wished to live only on his own terms’.​[3]​ Indeed the heroic quality of Socrates’ life and death emerge in numerous texts of the period: Coleman Phillipson ends his 1928 study of Socrates’ trial with an eloquent testimony to the power and pervasiveness of his legacy:
To those of us who have contemplated his pure life and his exultant death, to those of us who have pondered his recorded words, his memory is indeed an enduring fragrance.​[4]​
However, the legacy of Socrates’ philosophical method, and the meanings of his death, were, for a number of central modernist writers and philosophers, rather less sweet.
	The early years of the twentieth century displayed, as we have seen above, a very significant investment in mapping the continuities between the culture of ancient Greece and the culture of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Europe. But for many writers, the key to this continuity lay not in the work of Socrates, but in that moment Cornford designated as the ‘before’. Cornford and his colleague Jane Harrison’s interests in the relations between myth and ritual led them to develop a powerful anthropological interest in origins, and in the modes of thought and forms of ritual that lay beyond the key texts of a classical inheritance​[5]​. Such a project was underpinned by a very significant growth in scholarly interest in presocratic thought in the period, which found its most influential expression in John Burnet’s Early Greek Philosophy, published in 1908.​[6]​  
Burnet’s text was, as we shall see, profoundly important for a range of modernist artists and writers. Like Cornford, Burnet saw the presocratics as innovators who ‘turn[ed] their backs on the savage view of things’ (3-4). Overcoming local and embedded cultures in favour of ambitious systematisation emerges in Burnet’s account as key to the creation of new modes of scientific inquiry between 600 and 400 BC. Burnet offers a detailed account of presocratic thinkers, including Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Anaxagoras. He stresses their aspiration to define and to describe an ‘uncreated, indestructible reality’ (16), dwells on attempts to understand an underlying unity beneath apparently warring opposites, and explores the dynamism of this philosophical moment, as well as its ability to grasp the significance of movement and of flux: ‘what men commonly call coming into being and passing away is really mixture and separation’ (303). The legacy of such materialist, innovative, dynamic, modes of inquiry, so powerfully invoked by Burnet, was to prove a source of great fascination for key modernist writers as they sought to imagine, and to argue themselves, beyond the abstractions and the ethical values they associated with the philosophical and cultural inheritance of Socrates. Blaming Socrates became, as we shall see, an important philosophical and ethical trope in the modernist exploration of the nature, and the limitations of, an historical imagination.



‘It has become a dogma, unquestioned and
unexamined, that Nietzsche repudiated Socrates’.​[7]​


The critical interrogation of modernity via the figure of Socrates conjures up inevitably and inescapably the philosophical writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s ascription of a central role for Socrates in the death of Greek tragedy (in The Birth of Tragedy, 1872) is well known:
Socrates, however (…) did not comprehend and therefore did not esteem the Old Tragedy; in alliance with him Euripides dared to be the herald of a new art. If it was this of which the older tragedy perished, then aesthetic Socratism was the murderous principle.​[8]​
Socrates is here associated with a disruption of the productive balance between Apollonian and Dionysian forces which had enabled the creative energies of Aeschylus and Sophocles to find such culturally resonant expression. Nietzsche writes, for example, that for Socrates ‘consciousness becomes the creator – truly a monstrosity per defectum’ (BT, section 14). Socrates’ excessive intellectualism becomes an unstoppable cultural tendency towards idealism and spirituality, and the chaotic and dark forces of the Dionysian are denied appropriate cultural expression: ‘the Apollonian tendency has withdrawn into the cocoon of logical schematism’ (BT, 14).
This logical schematization leads, in turn, to a destructive and pervasive optimism. Socratic reason can, Nietzsche suggests, breathe only in ‘cool clarity and consciousness’ and consequently generates ‘the optimistic element which, having once penetrated tragedy must gradually overthrow its Dionysian regions and impel it necessarily to self-destruction’ (BT, 14). Thus Nietzsche stages his vision of tragedy’s untimely demise, driven to commit suicide by the corrosive effects of Socratic reason and optimism.  Once there ‘must be a necessary, visible connection between virtue and knowledge, faith and morality’ (BT, 14), the death of tragedy, for Nietzsche, is assured.
But Nietzsche’s argument in The Birth of Tragedy was not in any sense academic: his excavation of the cultural and intellectual history of Greece is framed by an urgency of contemporary inquiry. In section fifteen of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche writes that ‘it must now be seen how the influence of Socrates, down to the present moment and even into all future time, has spread over posterity like a shadow that keeps growing in the evening sun’. Socrates, Nietzsche argues, inaugurated a cultural moment, which is still in some sense our cultural moment. Nietzsche goes on to suggest that ‘we cannot fail to see in Socrates the turning point and vortex of so-called world history’ (BT, 15).  I will return to this notion of ‘world history’ below, but it is useful to pause over the audacity of Nietzsche’s periodization here. Gone is the tripartite structure of classicism, medievalism and modernity in favour of a long modernity reaching back to the fifth century BC, a modernity whose logic Nietzsche feels himself to be confronting in particularly stark ways. As a recent critic has noted, indeed, ‘en marquant ainsi le commencement, il voulait aussi nommer les conditions d’une fin esperée’ [In thus designating the beginning, he wished also to designate the conditions for a desired end].​[9]​
The end of modernity is an explicit concern of the Nietzsche text to which I will now turn, Twilight of the Idols (1888), in which Nietzsche once more includes extensive discussion of the philosophical and cultural legacy of Socrates, particularly in the short section entitled ‘The Problem of Socrates’.​[10]​  Nietzsche’s tone in this text is notably more abusive. Even Walter Kaufmann, who works consistently to establish the degree to which Nietzsche respected and admired Socrates, concedes that the vitriol of this text cannot be passed over.​[11]​  Kaufmann’s treatment of the personally abusive tone of this text, echoed by many later critics, depends in part on the notion that Nietzsche has identified increasingly vigorously with the figure of Socrates as an initiator of new paradigms, and as an individual denounced and rejected by his contemporaries. Kaufmann suggests in his ‘Introduction’ to The Birth of Tragedy that ‘the “artistic Socrates” is Nietzsche himself’ (12), and recent critics have developed this idea by suggesting that Twilight of the Idols be read as a desperate attempt to break this transferential relationship to his philosophical ancestor, ‘[Nietzsche] ne put jamais être certain que la laideur de Socrate n’était pas, en définitive, le reflet de la sienne’ [(Nietzsche) could never be sure whether the ugliness of Socrates was not, at the end of the day, the reflection of his own]; so that ‘dans ses derniers écrits, Nietzsche tente de dépasser son lien intellectuel et affectif avec Socrate’ [In his late writings, Nietzsche attempts to move beyond his intellectual and affective ties to Socrates].​[12]​
For the purposes of this article, however, I am interested less in the psychological underpinnings of Nietzsche’s attack on Socrates, and more on the historical model which makes of Socrates such a recalcitrant ‘problem’. In Twilight of the Idols, Socrates is associated with disease and with decay, leading Nietzsche to pose the question of whether ‘the great wise men are declining types’ (11). Moving on from the idea that Socrates generated the process of modernity, in this text Nietzsche sees him rather as its symptom. Socrates’ low social origins make him one of the ‘rabble’, his physical ugliness is an expression of his criminal nature, and his hallmark is ‘jaundiced malice’ (12).  Nietzsche returns once more to the equation ‘reason=virtue=happiness’ which had caused him such unease in The Birth of Tragedy, insisting that such an equation has ‘all the instincts of the older Hellene ranged against it’ (12). But now this equation is linked to the philosophical method of dialectical reason in a way that makes is symptomatic of social and cultural decay. Dialectic, Nietzsche suggests, represents the defeat of noble forms of authority and the institution of a mode of thinking and reasoning derived from the masses, ‘with dialectics the rabble comes out on top’ (13). He further argues that the employment of forms of dialectical argument amounts to a form of ressentiment, it is the ultimate defence of those who have no other form of power. And finally, Nietzsche argues, from being a tool to defeat existing forms of aristocratic power, reason becomes itself a tyrant. Rationality becomes not an expression of individual reason but rather an expression of total subservience: 
they had just one choice: either perish or – be absurdly rational…The moralism of Greek philosophers from Plato onwards is pathologically conditioned: likewise their appreciation of dialectics. Reason=virtue=happiness means simply: we must imitate Socrates and establish permanent daylight to combat the dark desires – the daylight of reason. We must be clever, clear, bright at all costs: any yielding to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads downwards… (15).
This bright, cold, reason is what Nietzsche wills the end of in his evocation of ‘twilight’. Socrates, Nietzsche argues, was a ‘misunderstanding’ (15): a kind of social and cultural sickness from which he would have us recover.  But this recovery, it would seem, means the repudiation of abstract reason, the denunciation of the rabble, and a complete renunciation of any project of moral or social ‘improvement’.  
So, for Nietzsche, Socrates not only figures the beginning of modernity, but he also embodies this beginning as a form of disease. He is the legacy of abstraction, reason, and power, which Nietzsche would challenge through a remorseless setting in play of instinct, and a pitiless rejection of what we might think of either as civilization or as progress. The importance and complex resonances of Nietzsche’s philosophical writings within the broad context of modernist cultural expression in Britain have been widely explored, and are something to which I will return below.​[13]​ The next writer to whom I will turn, however, is less familiar as a theoretical voice of modernism, though I have argued elsewhere for his central importance to the cultural imagination of modernism in Britain in the early twentieth century.​[14]​  In the work of Georges Sorel we will also find an interrogation of the legacy of Socratic reason, enmeshed in a polemical and complex theory of historical change.
Georges Sorel was born in Cherbourg in 1847.  He trained as an engineer and worked at first as a civil servant. His prolific historical and theoretical writings, including The Illusions of Progress (1908), and Reflections on Violence (1908) engage with economic theory, political philosophy, and intellectual and cultural history.  He embodies in his writings the intensity and imagist concentration of literary high modernism, while also showing a broader commitment to modernity in his fascination with technique, technology, and the motors of historical change. His writings engage with many of the central philosophers of the modern condition, including Marx, Vico, William James and Henri Bergson. Sorel's were indeed among the first serious and sustained engagements with Marx's thought in France. In the intensity of philosophical and political debate about the revision of Marx's ideas that followed the death of Engels in 1895, Sorel's particular contribution lay in his commitment to the centrality of syndicats for any analytic or imaginative account of the contemporary historical process: a commitment expressed particularly in his polemical engagement with the myth of the General Strike.
This article will not, however, be concerned with Sorel’s very familiar philosophical and political engagement with the General Strike, but rather with his less well known first published book, The Trial of Socrates (1889). I will be concerned to understand the ways in which Sorel uses Socrates to embody specific identified historical changes in structures of governance, visions of heroism, and understandings of the philosophical process, and also to map the ways in which Sorel seeks to animate, through the character of Socrates, his version of an historical imagination.
Sorel begins his exploration of the trial of Socrates with some reflections on the pervasive and highly charged significance of Socrates as an embodiment of freedom of thought, and resistance to authority. Sorel invokes the metaphorical association of Socrates and Christ, arguing that there is no shortage of thinkers disposed to compare the torture of Socrates to the passion of Christ.​[15]​ This association has, indeed, a long history, as Eric MacPhail argues in a recent article on Montaigne and the trial of Socrates: ‘For the Renaissance, Socrates was an ethical hero, abstracted from time and place, whom Erasmus praised as a figure of Christ and whom Montaigne chose as the finest example of humanity in the closing pages of his Essais’.​[16]​  This association of Socrates with Christ, or rather the association of Socratic thought with Christianity, will re-emerge in later parts of this article, playing out the logic of sacrifice, the practice of renunciation, and exemplifying the dangers of excess spirituality. 
Sorel’s critique of Socrates is fundamentally directed at what he sees as the pernicious consequences of Socrates’ repudiations of the values and virtues of a more ancient Greek culture. He sees Socrates’ philosophical legacy as destructive, rather than as emancipatory: ‘Les Socratiques réclamaient la liberté de détruire l’ancienne société, mais ils ne demandaient pas la liberté d’examen’ (Procès, 7)  [The Socratics demanded the freedom to destroy an ancient society, but they did not insist on freedom of inquiry]. Sorel’s central critique of Socrates is associated with Socrates’ apparent failure to understand the social and ethical centrality of labour. As John Stanley puts it in his introduction to Sorel’s writings, Socrates was disliked as ‘a spokesman for the life of the mind rather than the life of production’.​[17]​  Sorel was strongly attached to what he understood to be the structure and the mores of the old Greek city-states. The farmer-warriors of these ancient city-states seemed to Sorel to be an admirable model for the integration of theory and practice, and he denounced the disruption of such an order by the invention of the categories of the professional politician and the professional intellectual, which he saw as the fundamental condition and the fundamental curse of modernity. Stanley asserts that, ‘instead of the single-class state of farmer-soldiers that existed in pre-Socratic times, the Greece of Socrates is a three-class state of farmers, professional politicians and professional intellectuals’.​[18]​ This separation into classes, Sorel argues, is properly understood as a form of disintegration, and it is the burden of much of his subsequent writing to find a way of drawing together the physical, the intellectual and the political into a new form of modern consciousness and a new form of political praxis.​[19]​
Work, then, is a ‘question of no importance’ in the Socratic tradition (Procès, 85), but a matter of ethical centrality for and in modernity. And Socrates’ withdrawal from the mores and values of the old city-states has, for Sorel, one further serious consequence. It leads him to belittle the significance of the domestic as the location and generator of social values: ‘la théorie de Socrate éloignait l’homme de la maison’ (Procès, 95) [Socrates’ theories distanced man from the home], since the exclusion of women from the gymnasium, from the seminar, and of course from war left them unable to play a role in the ‘union des âmes’ (95) [union of souls] so desired by Socratic thought. The division between the domestic and the intellectual is seen by Sorel as undermining robust ethical values based on the centrality of conjugal love which he argues were central to the ancient Greek city-state. Sorel is distinctly uneasy about Socrates’ preference for spiritual or abstract forms of love, and he accuses him of driving the erotic towards a disembodied mysticism that again creates social and individual fragmentation.
In place of the local, the familial and the practical, Socrates places the universal, the idealized and the theoretical. And for Sorel this leads inexorably to forms of power that are unequal, bureaucratic and fundamentally undemocratic: ‘lorsqu’une société se trouve divisée, au point de vue de la connaisance, en classes distinctes, la question oligarchique ne tarde pas à se poser’ (Procès, 179) [Once a society finds itself divided, from the point of view of knowledge, into distinct classes, the question of oligarchy is not slow to pose itself]. Intellectual specialization, combined with the disruption of older social orders, leads to a culture of secrecy, intrigue and the misuse of power. In that sense, Sorel suggests, Socrates’ death shows him to be a simply a victim of his own success. Though he seemed opposed to the democratic thrust of his contemporary Greek society, Socrates had actually written the rules and the ethical codes of the modern state with all its murderous energies and its abstract and deadly political logics.  Understanding the psychology as well as the philosophy of Socrates is, for Sorel, as way of connecting to the historical process, and of opening modernity up to the disruptive and transformative energies of presocratic Greek culture.
I want to turn now to two writers whose canonical place within the context of modernism in the British Isles makes them a particularly fruitful site for the exploration of the ways in which thinking about history and culture within Britain led so unerringly to an engagement with the life and the legacy of Socrates in this period. I will discuss, first of all, W. B. Yeats, and in particular his theorization of history in A Vision, and will then turn briefly to the importance of presocratic thought for the cultural imagination of D. H. Lawrence. 
Yeats’s profound engagement by and in mystical thought and comparative religion is well known. His early writings on poetic symbolism demonstrate the extent to which he saw artistic creativity as a mode of engagement with images and with rituals that transcended the space and time-bound patterns of narrative histories. His membership of the Dublin Hermetic Society, and then of the hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, from the mid 1880s further demonstrated his belief in the transformative power of symbolism and of ritual both for the individual and for the nation.  Yeats saw himself as ‘leading the revolt of the soul against the intellect’​[20]​, drawing together the creative energies of the symbol and the enabling structures of poetic form to create new and liberating forms of insight and knowledge.​[21]​ Such explorations are not, of course, solitary affairs, as Yeats’s long-term membership of various hermetic and theosophical societies demonstrates. As a kind of footnote to a rather longer cultural history, it is worth noting in passing here the importance for Yeats in the 1890s of one particular writer on theosophy, Samuel L. M. Mathers.​[22]​ Mathers was married to Henri Bergson’s sister, Moina. Henri Bergson was also to become a key theoretical reference point for Sorel as he developed his thinking about the transformative temporalities of the General Strike in Reflections on Violence. Sorel cited with approval Bergson’s argument that 'the free act takes place in time which is flowing', and 'to act freely is to recover possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration',​[23]​ using it to underpin his own conceptualization of the liberatory potential of the General Strike as myth. This ‘coincidence’ of Bergson as a reference point for two such diverse thinkers as Sorel and Yeats points us to the intriguing ways in which networks of ideas, texts, friendships, and borrowings underpinned this cultural moment of early modernism.  If I add to this the observation that Yeats was also known to be reading Nietzsche in the early years of the century, the network becomes even tighter.
Yeats’s A Vision was first published in 1929. This complex and hybrid text sets out to capture the complexity of human personality by analogy to the phases of the moon, and to describe the movement of European history as a series of expanding and contracting gyres. It was composed over a long period and was written largely on the basis of material generated by Yeats’s wife as automatic writing. Yeats then published a substantially revised edition of the text in 1937: this edition was the culmination of twenty years of reflection on comparative religion and cultural history.  The text offers a fascinating glimpse into the ways in which Yeats wove together mysticism, symbolism and his own quite particular historical imagination.
In A Vision, Yeats generates a symbolic representation of history in terms of thousand-year periods of expansion and contraction. The conflictual energies that drive forward these historical phases generate the form of a cone, or gyre, whose movements follow a clearly designated pattern. As Yeats notes, having explored at length the phases and movements of the human soul, he was then taken by surprise by the emergence of two cones that ‘related neither to judgment nor to incarnations but to European history’ (77). Yeats is struck by the close associations between his patterns and the historical patterns seen by Spengler in his Decline of the West, to which I shall return below, but insists that his own insights precede the publication of Spengler’s text which ‘though founded upon a different philosophy, gives the same years of crisis and draws the same general conclusions’ (77).
Yeats develops his map of history through a consideration, primarily, of the growth and development of cultural forms, including sculpture, architecture, drama and poetry. He represents these as growing and declining in accordance with definite, and repeating, patterns each covering a period of one thousand years, ‘a millennium is the symbolic measure of a being that attains its flexible maturity and then sinks into rigid age’ (259).  Asked, after the appearance of the first edition, whether he sees these phases as substantial historical facts, or a metaphorical means to grasp the key aspects of a given historical period, Yeats offers a fascinating answer that connects his historical thinking robustly to modernist cultural experimentation: 
I regard them as stylistic arrangements of experience comparable to the cubes in the drawing of Wyndham Lewis and to the ovoids in the sculpture of Brancusi. They have helped me to hold in a single thought reality and justice. (86)
Yeats’s vision is not progressivist: he thinks, rather of ‘all civilizations equal at their best, every phase returns’ (217). This contrasts interestingly both with Nietzsche and Sorel, who seem to see modernity as a development, even if it is one that needs now to be overcome.  For Yeats, it is simply a phase, and one that, in some sense, we have seen before.  Nonetheless, as we shall see, Yeats does have his preferences, and these are emphatically presocratic.  Yeats argues, in an introductory letter to A Vision addressed to Ezra Pound, that Christ and Oedipus are to be understood as two opposing ends of a balance, or ‘butt-ends’ of a seesaw: ‘what if every two thousand and odd years something happens in the world to make one sacred and the other secular; one wise, the other foolish?’ (89).  On this vision, Christ and Oedipus represent the balance of opposing forces: one rooted firmly in the earth while the other is associated with ‘abstract sky’. Oedipus, Yeats argues, is ‘altogether separated from Plato’s Athens, from all that talk of the Good and the One, from all that cabinet of perfection’ (88). 
The Platonic strand is not, of course, absent from Yeats’s imagination. Neo-platonism is a fundamental component of theosophical thought, and Yeats was heavily influenced by his reading of Plotinus in his consideration of the social and individual significance of forms.  Nonetheless, in A Vision, Plato and the Socratic legacy more broadly are seen overwhelmingly in terms of images of death and decline. Yeats writes, for example:
Aristotle and Plato end creative system – to die into the truth is still to die – and formula begins. Yet even the truth into which Plato dies is a form of death, for when he separates the Eternal Ideas from Nature and shows them self-sustained he prepares the Christian desert and the Stoic suicide. (262)
And he goes on to argue that ‘After Plato and Aristotle, the mind is as exhausted as were the armies of Alexander at his death’ (262). These images of death and exhaustion are weaved into the association of Socratism both with Christianity and with sacrifice. Earlier in the text, indeed, Yeats had argued that ‘Plato thinks all things into unity and is the “First Christian”’ (256).  And this set of associations generates within Yeats a kind of longing, that we might be tempted to name as nostalgia, for a presocratic moment. We know that Yeats had been reading Burnet’s Early Greek Philosophy​[24]​ and A Vision contains important references to Heraclitus and to Anaximander, and an enthusiastic evocation of the culture and philosophy of the period ‘before Anaxagoras’ (261)  (although Anaxagoras is himself a ‘presocratic’, he is rather too near the Socratic moment for Yeats’s taste) . Yeats describes himself as longing to re-discover the lost ancient dramatists, to read the plays written before Aeschylus and Sophocles. And he expresses some unease about that moment of Doric vigour when the noble athlete appears on Greek pottery, since in this cultural form ‘one suspects a deliberate turning away from all that is Eastern, or a moral propaganda like that which turned the poets out of Plato’s Republic’ (261).  The Eastern here refers, of course, to the earlier moment of a Greek culture and philosophy rooted in Asia Minor, but for Yeats with his profound commitment to forms of Eastern mysticism, this ‘turning away’ from an East can only be read as a negation.  The high point of Athenian culture is, in this reading, a moment of decline and the end of a particular phase of heroic becoming: ‘Even before Plato, when Anaxagoras declared that thought created the world, heroic life began to pass away’ (262).
The next writer to whom I will now turn had also been reading Burnet’s Early Greek Philosophy at a formative moment:  D. H. Lawrence was sent a copy of this text by Bertrand Russell in June 1915.​[25]​ At this moment, Lawrence was involved in writing The Rainbow, and thus with trying to understand the possible creative relations between the aesthetic symbol and the historical process. The Rainbow is both a dynastic and a prophetic text, which reaches towards a symbolism that will transcend the temporality of generations while also locating individuality in its historical and geographical moment. Lawrence begins to reflect, in his letters and his essays, on the idea of the will, and to move towards a vision of will as an expression of an originary energy rather than of individual assertiveness. 
This exploration of will, symbol, and organic form will continue to preoccupy Lawrence over the coming years. To his reading of Burnet is added his awareness of Jane Harrison’s Ancient Art and Ritual, his encounter with theosophical thought, particularly through the writings of Charlotte Despard, and his reading of Leo Frobenius’s The Voice of Africa.​[26]​  Frobenius’s study of early African cultures was hugely influential for Lawrence, and also indeed for Yeats (V, 253): Frobenius’s uncovering of cultural artefacts and forms of historical consciousness among the Yoruba, beneath ‘the folly and banality of modern days’ (V of A, 4) had an impact every bit as bracing as the discovery of Minoan-Mycenean culture beneath the traces of Greek civilization, which so fascinated Freud.​[27]​ The collision of these different cultural histories, and the encounter with pre- or non-Christian philosophical or aesthetic categories were an extraordinary cultural and imaginary resource for Lawrence during and after the War. They allowed him to reconfigure his understanding of individuality, and of history, leading him to announce in Fantasia of the Unconscious (1922) that ‘I do not believe in evolution, but in the strangeness and rainbow-change of ever-renewed creative civilizations’.​[28]​  Fantasia is, indeed, one of the more vigorous statements of Lawrence’s repudiation of cerebral forms of consciousness, a repudiation that clearly finds expression across a whole range of Lawrence’s fictional writings. When he writes ‘thought is just a means to action, but life and action take rise actually at the great centres of dynamic consciousness ’ (F, 29); or when he denounces ‘the benevolent spiritual will, the will of the upper self’ (F, 55), Lawrence is distancing himself quite consciously from what he represents as the legacy of Christian thought.
This distancing finds explicit expression in a couple of letters specifically concerned with Lawrence’s responses to reading Burnet’s study of presocratic philosophy: ‘I have been wrong, much too Christian, in my Philosophy. These early Greeks have clarified my soul’.​[29]​ His turning to the early Greeks is explicitly linked to a repudiation of democracy: writing in the middle of the First World War, Lawrence was particularly wary of what he saw as the destructive and violent underpinnings of democratic legitimacy. In a letter to Bertrand Russell, Lawrence yokes Heraclitus to  his anti-democratic wagon, citing him to support the idea that taking the crowd for one’s teacher can only be an error, and invoking his image of a civilization that would purify itself by defiling itself with blood. The sentiment is re-echoed in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell, where Lawrence writes, ‘I shall write all my philosophy again. Last time I came out of the Christian camp. This time I must come out of these early Greek philosophers’.​[30]​ Once more this reading of early Greek philosophy is connected, in Lawrence’s mind, with a denunciation of the democratic impulse in modern cultures.
So presocratic philosophy leads Lawrence to ground his increasing antipathy towards democracy. It also leads him towards a series of cultural and philosophical texts concerned with the physical and material bases of individuality. And finally, it informs his increasing interest in dynamic modes of thought based on the irreconcilable clash of opposites rather than the reassuring resolution of the dialectic: an interest that finds expression in a text such as ‘The Crown’, written at the very moment we know Lawrence had just been reading Burnet’s Early Greek Philosophy.​[31]​  Lawrence’s repudiation of the Socratic legacy is uncompromising, but he has little to offer as an alternative. Despite his gesturing towards cultural history and aesthetic renewal, Lawrence is finally left with no position towards modernity except antipathy, bracing at times but always risking the very negativity he so much despises.
Lawrence’s rejection of a progressivist or evolutionary history in favour of the ‘rainbow-change of ever-renewed creative civilizations’ has echoes of a number of early twentieth–century theorizations of the historical process, which sought to imagine history as the growth and decline of phases, rather than as the unfolding of a progressive historical narrative. Thus, for example, the Egyptologist William Flinders Petrie argued in The Revolutions of Civilisation (1911) that ‘civilisation is an intermittent phenomenon’.​[32]​ Thus, he suggested, ‘it should be examined like any other action of Nature; its recurrences should be studied, and all the principles which underlie its variations should be defined’ (5). Civilizations on this model have a necessary shape, which is based on a model of growth, flowering, and subsequent decay. Flinders Petrie concludes his volume with a map purporting to show the parallel structures of growth and decay in Egyptian, Classical and Western civilizations. His judgements are derived largely from the analysis of cultural artefacts, and his conclusions reach towards a general theory of history: ‘there is no advance without strife. Man must strive with Nature or with man, if he is not to fall back and degenerate’ (125). This conclusion injects a perhaps surprising degree of agency onto what had seemed to be an entirely structural model of historical unfolding, but the idea of strife, and of repeating processes of growth and decay was to prove a very pervasive one in these early years of the century.
Certainly, Oswald Spengler’s search for a ‘logic of history’ in his massive study of The Decline of the West (1918) led him towards a similar model based on the growth and decline of parallel cultures.​[33]​ Spengler identified what he saw as a necessary structure for the development of cultures at different periods and in different places throughout the world: ‘eras, epochs and situations are ever repeating themselves’ (4). History was to be understood as the outward manifestation of a process that Spengler designates as Soul, wherein development and decline represent necessary parts of a recurring rhythm of history. Spengler is, in fact, pessimistic about the extent to which this Soul can take root in the ‘metaphysically–exhausted soil of the West’ (5) in the early twentieth century, but what engages him in this study is:
The drama of a number of mighty cultures, each springing with primitive strength from the soil of a mother region to which it remains firmly bound throughout its whole life-cycle. (21).
He offers a vision that encompasses world cultures. Rather than stressing the continuities between classical and modern cultures, Spengler stresses the strangeness of the Greeks, arguing that we and they are ‘not part of the same straight line’ (27). However, Spengler, throughout his text, explicitly prefers Soul to Intellect, so that his observation that, ‘No one would describe Heraclitus or Meister Ekhart as an intelligence, but Socrates and Rousseau were intelligent (…) There is something rootless in the word’ (409), signals that for Spengler too the historical meaning of Socrates is not an insignificant or unimportant question. Socrates may not, on this model, be understood as a turning point, or a key to an unfolding historical narrative. But in the rhythms and patterns that express the embodiment of the historical process in different places, Socrates is once more not on the side of growth or of hope. Spengler, like Flinders Petrie, concludes his study with a diagrammatic representation of the birth and decline of different world cultures, in Spengler’s case Indian, Classical, Arabian, and Western. Spengler uses the rhythm of the seasons as his classificatory principle: in the ‘summer’ we find the presocratics (and also Galileo, Descartes, Bacon and Pascal), while in the ‘autumn’ we find Socrates, keeping company with Locke, Voltaire and that arch-theorist of historical unfolding, Hegel.
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